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Abstract
In this paper we present explicit vector formulae for the Lagrange–Newton transformation L: Kn → Kn
and its inverse L−1 with respect to interpolating knots xi = xi−1 +  (i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1; x0 = ), where
 = 0, ,  belong to a ﬁeld K. These formulae depend on the wrapped convolution, Horner transformation,
iterative product and coordinatewise vector operations. All these transformations and operations, except of
O (n log n)—wrapped convolution, have running time of O (n) base operations from the ﬁeld K. Moreover,
we give an application of these fast interpolating transformations to threshold secret sharing schemes in
cryptography.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Let K be a ﬁeld with a primitive root  from unity of degree 2n [1]. Discrete Fourier transfor-
mation F: K2n → K2n and its inverse F−1 : K2n → K2n are deﬁned by
b = F(a), a = (a0, a1, . . . , a2n−1), b = (b0, b1, . . . , b2n−1),
bi =
2n−1∑
k=0
ak
ik (i = 0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1)
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and
ai = 12n
2n−1∑
k=0
bk
−ik (i = 0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1),
1
2n
=
⎛
⎝1 + 1 + · · · + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
2n-items
⎞
⎠−1 , 1-the unity in K.
It is well known that Fourier transformation F: K2n → K2n and its inverse can be computed by
the famous FFT-algorithm [1], which has a running time of O(n log n) base ﬁeld operations. It is
also well known that the same order of the cost is preserved during computing the convolution
a × b = (c0, c1, . . . , c2n−1)
and the wrapped convolution
a ⊗ b = (c0, c1, . . . , cn−1),
where a = (a0, a1, . . . , an−1), b = (b0, b1, . . . , bn−1) and
ci =
i∑
k=0
akbi−k (i = 0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1), (1)
with aj = bj = 0 for all j < 0 and jn. This follows directly from the following fundamental
identities:
a × b = F−1
[
F(E(a)) · F(E(b))
] (2)
and
a ⊗ b =
{
F−1 [F(a) · F(b)] + F−1 [F( · a) · F( · b)] /
}/
2, (3)
where  = (1,, . . . ,n−1), F = F: Kn → Kn with  = 2, vector operations · and / are
deﬁned coordinatewise, and the embedding transformation E: Kn → K2n satisﬁes
E(a) =
⎛
⎝a0, a1, . . . , an−1, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
⎞
⎠ , a = (a0, a1, . . . , an−1) ∈ Kn.
Moreover, these identities show directly that costs of computing both convolutions differ from
the costs of computing Fourier and inverse Fourier transformations on the right-hand sides of (2)
and (3) by a component of order O(n).
The main purpose of this note is to establish identities of the same type for the Lagrange–
Newton transformation and its inverse with interpolating knots generated dynamically by the
following recurrent formula:
xi = xi−1 +  (i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1; x0 = ), (4)
with  = 0,  and  in K. For this purpose we will use the wrapped convolution ⊗: Kn × Kn →
Kn, which is considered to be more efﬁcient in applications than the usual convolution × of
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K2n × K2n into K2n (cf. the famous Schönhage–Strassen algorithm [1]). Moreover, we will also
use the iterative product and Horner transformations M,H = H: Kn → Kn deﬁned by
M(a) = (1, a1, a1a2, . . . , a1a2 . . . an−1) and H(a) = (b0, b1, . . . , bn−1),
where coordinates bi are equal to
bi = bi−1+ ai (i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1; b0 = a0).
It should be noticed that the cost of computing these transformations has order O(n) of base
operations in K, and that the last recurrent formula turns out to be the Horner algorithm for
evaluating the polynomial
a(x) = a0xn−1 + a1xn−2 + · · · + an−1
at a point x = . Moreover, it is clear that  = M(z), whenever
z = (0,, . . . ,) ∈ Kn.
Finally, we note that our results aremotivated by, and extend the recent fast algorithms presented
in the paper [2] for computing Lagrange–Newton and inverse Lagrange–Newton transformations
in the particular cases, when either  = 0 and  = 1 or  = 1. This paper is also strongly
recommended, because of several additional results and references in this direction. In addition,
we give a new application of fast interpolating algorithms to threshold secret sharing schemes in
cryptography [4].
2. Fast Lagrange–Newton algorithm
The Fourier and inverse Fourier transformations describe the transformation between the power
basis 1, x, x2, . . . , xn−1 and the Lagrange basis
li (x) =
n−1∏
k=0
k =i
x − xk
xi − xk (xi = 
i , i = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1)
in the n-dimensional space Kn−1[x] of all polynomials
p(x) =
n−1∑
i=0
aix
i, ai = p
(i)(0)
i! ,
of degree less than n. More precisely, if we denote
p(x) =
n−1∑
i=0
bili(x), bi = p(x), (5)
then we have b = F(a) and a = F−1(b) with F = F, whenever  is a primitive root of degree
n from the unity.
In this section, we investigate the fundamental transformation c = L(b)(b ∈ Kn) of Lagrange
expansion (5) to the Newton expansion
p(x) =
n−1∑
i=0
cimi(x), ci = p[x0, x1, . . . , xi], (6)
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where
m0(x) = 1, mi(x) = (x − x0)(x − x1) · · · (x − xi−1)
and
ci = p[x0, x1, . . . , xi] =
i∑
j=0
bj
i∏
k=0
k =j
(xj − xk)
(i = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1) (7)
are divided differences with respect to pairwise distinct knots x0, x1, . . . , xn−1 in K. In general,
it is recommended to compute the Lagrange–Newton transformation c = L(b) by a O(n2)—
algorithm based on the following recurrent formulae:
p[xi] = bi (i = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1),
p[xi, xi+1, . . . , xk]=p[xi+1, xi+2, . . . , xk]−p[xi, xi+1, . . . , xk−1]
xk−xi (0 i < kn − 1).
However, if the pairwise distinct knots x0, x1, . . . , xn−1 are generated by the recurrent formula
(4), then there exists an efﬁcient O(n log n)—algorithm for this transformation.
Indeed, one can use formula (7) together with the identities
xi = i+ 
(
i−1 + i−2 + · · · + 1
)
and
j−k − 1 = (− 1)(j−k−1 + j−k−2 + · · · + 1)
to get
ci
[
(− 1)+ ]i i−1∏
k=0
k =
i∑
j=0
bj
[
(− 1)+ ]j j−1∏
k=0
k
j−1∏
k=0
[
k(j−k − 1)+ k
j−k−1∑
=0

]
·
[
(− 1)+ ]i−j j−1∏
k=j
k
i∏
k=j+1
[
j
(
1 − k−j ) − j k−j−1∑
=0

]
=
i∑
j=0
bj
j−1∏
k=0
k∑
m=0
m
·
(−1)i−j
i−j−1∏
k=0
k
i−j−1∏
k=0
k∑
m=0
m
.
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Here and in the following we assume that the products and sums with the upper indexes smaller
than the lower indexes have to be replaced by 1. Consequently, we receive
ci =
⎛
⎝ i∑
j=0
pjqi−j
⎞
⎠/ ri (i = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1), (8)
or equivalently
c = (p ⊗ q)/r, (9)
whenever we set
pj = bj
j−1∏
k=0
k∑
m=0
m
, qj =
(−1)j
j−1∏
k=0
k
j−1∏
k=0
k∑
m=0
m
, (10)
rj =
[
(− 1)+ ]j j−1∏
k=0
k (j = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1).
Note that coordinates
sk =
k−1∑
m=0
m (k = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1)
of the vector s = (s0, s1, . . . , sn−1) satisfy the recurrent formula
sk = sk−1 · + 1 (k = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1; s0 = 0),
which one can recognize as the Horner algorithm for the polynomial
s () = 0 · n−1 + n−2 + · · · + + 1.
In other words, we have
s = H (e) with e =
⎛
⎝0, 1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
⎞
⎠ ,
whereH = H: Kn → Kn denotes theHorner transformation. Hence the deﬁnition of the iterative
product
M(a) = (1, a1, a1a2, . . . , a1a2 . . . an−1) , a = (a0, a1, . . . , an−1) ∈ Kn,
yields the following formulae
p =
(
b0,
b1
s1
, . . . ,
bn−1
s1s2 . . . sn−1
)
= b/M(H(e)) with e = (0, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ Kn,
q = (1, (−1)10, . . . , (−1)n−101n−2)/M(H(e)) (11)
= M(−M(f ))/M(H(e)) with f = (0, 1, , . . . , ) ∈ Kn,
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r =
(
1, 01, 012, . . . , 01 . . . n−2n−1
)
=M(M(f )) with =(− 1)+ .
This completes the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If L: Kn → Kn denotes the Lagrange–Newton transformation with respect to the
pairwise distinct knots xi generated by formulae
xi = xi−1 +  (i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1;  = 0, x0 = ),
then we have
L(b) = {[b/M(H(e))] ⊗ [M(−M(f ))/M(H(e))]} /M(M(f )), (12)
where e, f ∈ Kn and  are as in formulae (11).
Now suppose additionally that  and  = 2 ( ∈ K) are primitive roots of unity of degree
2n and n, respectively. Then Theorem 1 yields the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Algorithm (12) for evaluating the Lagrange–Newton transformation has a running
time ofC(n)+O(n) of base operations from the ﬁeldK,whereC(n) denotes the cost of computing
the wrapped convolution.
Finally, we note that the computations of vectors p, q and r , occurring in the formula
L(b) = (p ⊗ q)/r,
can be done in one loop with the running time of O(n) of operations from K ; see Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1. The Lagrange–Newton transformation with respect to pairwise distinct knots x0, x1, . . . xn−1
generated by
xi = xi−1 +  (i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1; x0 = ).
Input: A vector b = (b0, b1, . . . , bn−1) ∈ Kn and three scalars  = 0, and  in a ﬁeld K.
Output: c = L(b) ∈ Kn.
1. Set p0 ← b0, q ← 1, r0 ← 1, ← (− 1) · + , s ← 0,
u ← 1, v ← 1/ and z ← 1.
2. For k from 1 to n − 1 do the following:
2.1 s ← s · + 1, u ← u · s, pk ← bk/u.
2.2 v ← v · , z ← −z · v, qk ← z/u.
2.3 rk ← rk−1 · v · .
3. Compute c ← (p ⊗ q)/r .
4. Return (c).
3. Fast inverse Lagrange–Newton algorithm
In this section we consider the inverse transformation L−1: Kn → Kn to the Lagrange–Newton
transformation L, which has been studied in the previous section. For this purpose, note that
b = L−1(c) (c ∈ Kn),
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describes passing from the Newton basis expansion
p(x) =
n−1∑
j=0
cj
j−1∏
k=0
(x − xk), cj = p[x0, x1, . . . , xj ],
to the Lagrange basis expansion
p(x) =
n−1∑
j=0
bj
n−1∏
k=0
k =0
(x − xk)
xj − xk , bj = p(xj ),
where p(x) is a polynomial in Kn−1[x] (the n-dimensional space of all polynomials of degree
less than n over a ﬁeld K) and x0, x1, . . . , xn−1 are pairwise distinct interpolating knots in the
ﬁeld K. Since we have
bi =
i∑
j=0
cj
j−1∏
k=0
(xi − xk) (i = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1), (13)
to compute bi one can apply the Horner like algorithm of the form
bj = bj+1(xi − xj ) + cj (j = i − 1, i − 2, . . . , 0; bi = ci),
where 0 i < n. The running time of this algorithm is O(n2) of operations in the ﬁeld K. It can
be reduced to O(n log n) of operations in K, whenever the interpolating knots x0, x1, . . . , xn−1
satisfy a recurrent formula of form (4) for some  = 0,  and  in K.
For the proof, we insert
xi = i+ 
(
i−1 + i−2 + · · · + 1
)
into (13) to get
bi =
i∑
j=0
cj
j−1∏
k=0
[(
k
(
i−k − 1
)
+ k
) i−k−1∑
=0

]
=
i∑
j=0
cj
j−1∏
k=0
k
[
(− 1) + ] j−1∏
k=0
i−k−1∑
=0

=
i−1∏
k=1
k∑
=0

i∑
j=0
cj
[
(− 1) + ]j j−1∏
k=0
k
1
i−j−1∏
k=0
k∑
=0

.
Hence we obtain
bi =
⎛
⎝ i∑
j=0
pjqi−j
⎞
⎠ ri (i = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1) , (14)
or equivalently
b = (p ⊗ q) · r, (15)
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whenever we set
pj = cj
[
(− 1) + ]j j−1∏
k=0
k and
1
qj
= rj =
j−1∏
k=0
k∑

.
This in conjunction with (11) yields the following theorem.
Theorem 2. If L−1: Kn → Kn is the inverse Lagrange–Newton transformation with respect to
the knots satisfying
xi = xi−1 +  (i = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1; x0 = ) ,
then the formula
L−1 (c) = {[cM (M (f ))]⊗ [1/M (H (e))]}M (H (e)) , (16)
holds with  and vectors e, f as in Theorem 1. Moreover, this formula yields the algorithm with
a running time of C(n) + O(n) of base operations from the ﬁeld K, where C(n) denotes the cost
of computing the wrapped convolution.
For the completeness, we present in Algorithm 2 more details of computing the inverse
Lagrange–Newton transformation L−1 (c) by using formula (16).
Algorithm 2. The inverse Lagrange–Newton transformation with respect to knots x0, x1, . . . , xn−1 generated by
xi = xi−1 +  (i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1; x0 = ).
Input: A vector c = (c0, c1, . . . , cn−1) ∈ Kn and three scalars  = 0, and  in a ﬁeld K.
Output: b = L−1(c) ∈ Kn.
1. Set p0 ← c0, r0 ← 1, ← (− 1) · + , s ← 0,
v ← 1/ and w ← 1.
2. For k from 1 to n − 1 do the following:
2.1 v ← v · , w ← w · v · , pk ← ck · w.
2.2 s ← s · + 1, rk ← rk−1 · s.
3. Compute b ← (p ⊗ 1
r
) · r .
4. Return (b).
Finally, we give an application of Algorithms 1 and 2 to cryptography. Another applications
of these algorithms to polynomial extrapolation [3] and local spline interpolation [5] will be
presented elsewhere.
Example 1. Let us consider a secret sharing scheme of Shamir type [4,6]with respect to aNewton
basis of Kn−1 [x] with artiﬁcially small n = 256, where K = Z65537 is a ﬁeld of integers modulo
65537. More precisely, suppose that a dealer does the following:
(i) in a random way chooses numbers  = 23,  = 865,  = 1497, = 34543, = 52227
and a polynomial
p (x) = 347 + 11 (x − x0) + 987 (x − x0) (x − x1) (x − x2)
+ 406 (x − x0) (x − x1) · · · (x − x248) + 937 (x − x0) (x − x1) · · · (x − x249)
+ 5 (x − x0) (x − x1) · · · (x − x253) + 3001 (x − x0) (x − x1) · · · (x − x254) ,
where x0 = 1497 and xi = 23xi−1 + 865 (i = 1, 2, . . . , 255);
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(ii) deﬁnes the polynomial key 	 = 3471198740693753001, which guarantees opening an
access gate to the secret;
(iii) applies Algorithm 2 to compute the secret shares p(xi) (i = 0, 1, . . . , 255) and distributes
a ﬁxed number (say 9) of the following shares
(x0, y0) = (1497, 347) , (x1, y1) = (35296, 44451) , (x2, y2) = (26229, 10251) ,
(x3, y3) = (14299, 14787) , (x4, y4) = (2057, 50077) , (x5, y5) = (48176, 57863) ,
(x6, y6) = (60321, 56209) , (x7, y7) = (11971, 40569) , (x8, y8) = (14050, 26491)
among participants of the secret sharing, and the remaining 247 secret shares (xi, yi)
(9 i < 256) together with n, , ,  and  gives to the combiner.
Then the combiner can recover the key 	 and get the required access after receiving all shares
from the participants of the secret sharing. For this purpose, he has only to apply Algorithm 2 in
order to show that the nonzero coefﬁcients of the polynomial
p (x) =
256∑
i=0
ai
i−1∏
k=0
(x − xi)
are equal to
a0 = 347, a1 = 11, a3 = 987, a249 = 406, a250 = 937, a254 = 5, a255 = 3001.
It is important that the secret sharing scheme can be changed in such a way that the dealer is
allowed to generate more shares at pairwise distinct interpolating knots xi than n, let us say 512.
These additional shares are given to the combiner. In this case, the combiner uses Algorithm 2 to
recover the key
	 = a0a1a3a249a250a254a255 = 3471198740693753001.
Next he can claim with large probability that participants did not deceive only in the case when
Algorithm 2 establishes that among coefﬁcients of the polynomial
p (x) =
512∑
i=0
ai
i−1∏
k=0
(x − xk)
there are exactly seven distinct from zero.
Finally, we note that the dealer and combiner can safe more than 99 percent of base operations
in the ﬁeld K, whenever the dealer chooses n of order 214 at least. Additionally, it is possible to
replace wrapped convolutions
p ⊗ q and p ⊗ 1
r
in Algorithms 1 and 2 by convolutions
p × q and p × 1
r
,
respectively. However, these changes require embedding corresponding vectors p, q, r in K2n
and projecting the ﬁnal vectors from K2n onto Kn by taking n ﬁrst coordinates of them. In other
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words, computations with convolution × require the doubling of the used memory and working
in K2n instead of Kn.
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